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Booth: Booth on Asad

Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity. Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2003. 269 pp. ISBN 0804747679.
Reviewed by Marilyn Booth, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
"Secular" is a quality that is often invoked, suggesting a concept that is transparent. That
assumption in itself, together with the concept's easy prevalence in public discourse today, is a
product of the forces that form the word's genealogy, suggests Talal Asad's deeply thoughtful
meditation on human beings' struggles to live together in today's world. This is a timely book, for
these days the bases of our understandings of political legitimacy appear open to question—or
should be open to debate—as much as they have ever been in recent times, despite increasingly
sophisticated theorizations of the nation-state as the modern unit of collective life. Formations of
the Secular is also a difficult if stunningly eloquent book, a response both elusive and forthright
to the many shelves of "books on terrorism" which this country's trade publishers are rushing
into print. Would that consumers of those volumes were readers of this one, but as Asad takes on
academic cultural theory as well as contemporary politics in this series of interlinked essays, the
audience is likely to remain an academic one.
Asad observes that scholars have paid more attention to "secularism" than to "the idea of the
secular" (21) (and far more attention to religion than to either one). Yet we cannot understand the
political doctrine—secularism—without coming to grips with the epistemological category of
"the secular." And, argues Asad, "the secular is best approached indirectly" (67). This is exactly
how he proceeds, through a bracing series of entry points—theories of liberalism; changing
notions of myth running from the Greeks to Fontenelle to Paul de Man to Adonis, along with the
modern belief that "disenchantment" means closer access to "the real"; radically different
practices concerning relationships among bodily pain, suffering, and agency. Asad then
considers "secularism" against understandings of the nation-state and "modernity"; in relation to
human rights discourse and its "international" elaborations; and with regard to how resident
Muslim communities in Europe challenge notions of "European identity." If Formations begins
with the general finding that secularism "is an enactment by which a political
medium(representation of citizenship) redefines and transcends particular and differentiating
practices of the self that are articulated through class, gender, and religion" (5), proliferating
elaborations of the concept's work in the world add complexity to that view:
'the secular' should not be thought of as the space in which real human life gradually emancipates
itself from the controlling power of 'religion' and thus achieves the latter's relocation. It is this
assumption that allows us to think of religion as 'infecting' the secular domain or as replicating
within it the structure of theological concepts. …. Secularism doesn't simply insist that religious
practice and belief be confined to a space where they cannot threaten political stability or the
liberties of 'free-thinking' citizens. Secularism builds on a particular conception of the world.
(191)
Practically speaking, the objective must be the creation of a horizontal solidarity that requires not
a redeployment of categories so much as a change in their meaning: politics, ethics, religion. In
the book's final essay, Asad illustrates the process of category change in formation through an
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inquiry into late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century Egypt, a colonial state undergoing
transformation of its legal system, among other radical changes.
From within his discipline of anthropology, Asad—who is Distinguished Professor of
Anthropology at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York—also has much to say
about academe. He offers a forthright critique of academics' tendencies to deploy au courant
terms without thinking through their meanings, and he does put forward his own thinkingthrough of such terms as "empowerment," "agency," "intentionality," "resistance," and of course
"autonomy" and "modernity." Asad works from an understanding of anthropology that draws in
particular from the work of Marcel Mauss, which he routes through Mary Douglas, emphasizing
"the comparison of embedded concepts (representations) between societies differently located in
time or space . . . the forms of life that articulate them, the powers they release or disable" (17).
In considering secularism as an "embedded concept" across different societies, and in drawing on
its different relations to structures of metaphor and varying conceptions of how humans represent
themselves, Asad's work speaks to concerns and methodologies of comparatists in all domains of
expressive culture.
Asad argues that "the secular" is a way of thinking "the human" which had to occur before
"secularism" could find the purchase it has in contemporary, globalizing societies. "The secular"
is both formative of and consequent on Western historical narratives of collective being.
Secularism, Asad reminds us, doesn't clear the playing field but rather draws the lines
differently: "A secular state does not guarantee toleration; it puts into play different structures of
ambition and fear. The law never seeks to eliminate violence since its objective is always to
regulate violence" (8). Yes, assumptions that tolerance would inevitably arise in secular systems
based on "reason" have been interrogated by such writers as Michael Taussig. Yet these
inquiries, Asad claims, don't reopen the space of the secular to examination.
A strength of Asad's discussion is that he does not abstract the nation-state, civil society, or
anything else from the realm of power politics, arguing against Charles Taylor, for instance, that
one cannot assume a public sphere in which "persuasion and negotiation" reign supreme, and
against Martha Nussbaum that the free use of "good capabilities" is subject to whatever in a
particular public sphere of freedom has the power to define what "good capabilities" are. "The
nation-state is not a generous agent," remarks Asad, "and its law does not deal in persuasion" (6).
This attention to realities of coercion—from demands for "freed" markets to calibrated practices
of torture to the inevitability of a public sphere that presupposes certain categories of
participants—is one feature that gives the book its almost uncanny timeliness. Thus, American
narratives of redemption work on the global stage to foreground certain constituencies and to
erase others, in conjunction with a secular notion of "the human" that defines certain kinds of
pain as gratuitous while other types are "necessary" to attain something we call modernity: Asad
maps the political onto his genealogy of the secular, not as an "illustration" of the latter but as a
constituent element of its primacy. To think through the historical construction of "the secular"
and the production of "secularism" as a political project is to open an analytic window on
"modernity," in its equally normative quality.
Asad draws upon Foucault's notion of "genealogy" in tracing the secular, characterizing
"genealogy" beautifully as "a way of working back from our present to the contingencies that
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have come together to give us our certainties" (16). He grounds his investigation of how people
understand 'the secular' in attitudes to and practices of embodiment. How, for example, are our
attitudes to personal responsibility formed by different ways of linking bodily experience to
sources of authority? And how are notions of authority by and through which we live shaped by
the ways we explain bodily experiences and practices? Asad's most sustained analysis here has to
do with economies of pain: with what culturally specific meanings the experience of pain comes
to be endowed. Can pain itself be—rather than spur—agency? And doesn't this possibility
undermine the easy assumption of cultural theorists now that agency necessarily means "historymaking"? How is a denial of pain as agency connected to the prime position that rationality holds
in our notion of secular subjectivities? Isn't that assumption of primacy part of our constitution as
modern secular subjects?
The secular is neither a "mask for religion" (26) nor a replacement; it does not fill the same space
but rather redraws conceptual and political maps; a comparative perspective can look at the
"series of particular oppositions" through which secularism "works" (25). As part of his multipronged attack on the assumption that the secular is the obverse of the religious, Asad
historicizes another familiar dichotomy: the sacred versus the profane. Based on the careful
scholarship of a number of anthropologists and historians of religion, his discussion notes that
"the sacred" moved from being a quality of discrete "places, objects, and times, each requiring
specific conduct" to "sacredness" as a "unitary domain" constructed in large part through the
needs of anthropologists. In other words, in certain culturally and historically specific settings
the relationship between the object as set-aside and the bases of its sacral quality, or the conduct
this required, had not been a constant. It was the construction of "the sacred" as a domain rather
than a quality that, among other things, signaled formation of something called "the secular,"
whereas orienting these two as oppositions was a rhetorical move that effaced the particular
meanings of each. And this was also a change from sacred quality residing in an object wherein
signifier and signified were not separable to "the essentialization of 'the sacred' as an external,
transcendent power" (35).
Asad suggests, somewhat sketchily, that this conception of the sacred as a space apart, with
disciplinary implications, had to do with Europe's imperialist quests, as indeed "sacred" comes to
name those aspects of European post-Enlightenment political organization that can become
justificatory arguments for colonial "tutelage," while "superstition" comes to name those
practices that require taming in the name of (European) "civilization." Thus Asad appears to
mourn the loss of certain kinds of habitus—of bodily, sensory experiences of a divine presence,
of faith as lived through bodily practice, a loss sustained when "faith" becomes instead an
epistemological category, a mode of knowledge acquisition. He contrasts secular notions of
embodiment that assume that a state of pain will necessarily denote passivity, to the Muslim's
formation of virtuous conduct through embodied practices wherein "conscious commitment,"
embodied learned practices, emotions that carry pain, are all part of and expressive of faith—
where "the-body-and-its-capacities is not owned solely by the individual but is subject to a
variety of obligations held by others as fellow Muslims" (91).
It will be evident from the discussion thus far that this book takes up many issues familiar to
dwellers in the postmodern academy. Asad draws boldly and appreciatively on a wide range of
scholarship in history, philosophy, and the study of law to use as signposts in his own
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meanderings. He is adept at, and honest about, prising from his wide reading elements that allow
him to riff on his own interests, sometimes haunting their byways ("what interests me more here
is . . ."). He gives us the academic equivalent of an exhilarating roller-coaster ride. Of course, the
danger in such synthetic boldness is that one opens oneself to specialists in each field who may
have their quarrels to pick. My particular bailiwick compels me to raise a few questions about his
final chapter. Asad argues that the practical redefinition of shari'a (law and way, a mode of
living based on Islam's foundational texts, including those inscribing the Prophet's acts and
advisories) into "personal status law" in modern Egypt meant not simply a relegation of
"religious law" to a smaller sphere but rather a rethinking and re-placement of the categories of
law, ethics, and politics that made it possible to articulate a separation, in that time and place, not
only of legal spheres but indeed of "law" as opposed to the embodied sunna, or way of the
Prophet, as an all-encompassing mode of collective as well as individual being in the world.
Drawing on several eminent scholars of shari'a and fiqh (jurisprudence), Asad reminds us that
for centuries, and throughout Muslim-majority societies, Muslim thinkers and practitioners of the
law have critically debated the elaborations of this "way." Criticism, rather than a rejection of the
tradition, is in fact interior to that tradition and in line with it. Yet in representing certain strands
of debate within turn-of-the-twentieth-century Egypt (as one historically specific setting of such
debates), Asad's urging of historically sensitive, careful and precise comparative work seems
occasionally at odds with the particular terminologies on which he relies. He makes much of the
historically specific emergence of certain terms, but I'm not convinced that his genealogical work
here is as specific as it could be. In tracing Arabic lexica—'almanayy, "secular"; mujtama',
"society"—he relies on major dictionaries published at distinct points in the nineteenth century.
These dictionaries were produced by European orientalists or (in one case) by a Christian Arab
associated with the American Protestant missionary crowd in Beirut. Although they are respected
sources, one needs to ask whether they encapsulate usage in the eras in which they emerged and
among the constituents—Arab Muslim intellectuals—this essay pinpoints. Moreover,
dictionaries tend to legislate after the fact, once a word is in usage, a point Asad doesn't appear to
take into account. He notes that the word now used for society, mujtama', does not appear in any
of them. Yet, at least one term derived from the same lexical root was in use before the turn of
the century, al-hay'a al-ijtima'iyya, "the social structure," but in public polemics the term often
connoted "society" while foregrounding its formalized, institutional nature. When did "social
institution/structure" become "society," and is this a significant shift or a semantic-neutral
replacement to a less awkward usage? Also, Asad decides that Arabic had no concept for
"secularism" before (to go by his dictionaries) 1870, and he notes that in Europe the term
emerged in the mid-nineteenth century, yet implies that there was a longer time lag than this
actual dating suggests. (This is one of myriad concepts—feminism is another one—for which it
has been generally assumed that Arabic was far behind when in fact, in usage, Arabic speakers
were not much later at all in using the terminology, whether or not in the same ways.) Similarly,
Asad explains that the use of umma to denote not the Islamic umma—the community of
believers, a "theologically defined space" permitting worldly practice of religious obligations
(197)—but rather national or ethnic-cultural collectivities is a very significant conceptual
change. That is certainly true. But Asad implies that this transformation is very recent. However,
in Egypt at least umma was being used to designate "nation" in the sense of "community" (rather
than bilad as country or watan as homeland) in the nineteenth century, in a secular sense, before
the high period of Arab nationalism. Contrary to Asad's assessment (230), the term was indeed
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"available" in the late nineteenth century as a means of approximating "national community."
The recognition that umma was used slyly to mean perhaps-this and perhaps-that, confusions or
slippages or redundancies or new linkages in the emerging print culture of the time, might
contribute new dimensions to Asad's tracing of social spaces.
These points do not necessarily threaten the author's overarching analysis. But, since he insists
sensibly on "careful analysis of culturally distinct concepts and their articulation with one
another" (206), I would like to hold him to that excellent standard. This may make a difference in
attending to the ways local discourses were managing and reshaping imported ones. Surprisingly,
given his carefully historicized tracings of other concepts, Asad follows the now-canonical view
(but one challenged by some of us) that colonial mimicry best describes the work of Qasim
Amin, an early and controversial commentator on "the status of women." As the author says, "the
question of woman" (qadiyat al-mar'a) was a label for discussing (and defining) "the family" as
social/political unit in the urgent context of disengaging a collectivity from British imperial rule.
(It was also a camouflage for debate on ideal and changing masculinities, truly the problem that
has no name, or rather refuses a name).
In all but name, Qasim Amin set himself up as "the father of Egyptian feminism," an epithet
which became more rather than less salient as time went on. Yet he was joining a debate in
progress rather than beginning one, and much of what he said responded to that local debate
rather than—or more significantly than—echoing the pious pronouncements of British
imperialists on the status of Egyptian women and the family. This, too, is important
"genealogically" because what Asad suggests was new—constructing the family in a mode
consonant with a rearticulation of social spaces—had been going on for some time. I'm not
convinced that this "new" articulation of family, around an emerging discourse on modern
femininity that was particularly interesting for its construction of classed femininities in the
emerging polity, was either limited to "Western-educated reformers" (233) or necessarily as
neatly convergent with imperial discourse or, ultimately, "formations of the secular" as Asad
suggests. One need only read "Islamic nationalist" (for lack of a better rubric) daily newspapers
from the 1890s to wonder.
Amin supported different agendas at different moments, a point that scholars have long noted but
that needs to be inserted into a broader study of discourse in the period. Amin's "westernizing"
tendency is generally linked to what he had to say about "the veil." But here, at least before his
latest writing (and Asad refers to his second, not his third book), Amin was considerably more
nuanced than the now-dominant narrative suggests. When Amin writes of "veiling," his
comments actually have more to do with seclusion in the home: ihtijab as opposed to hijab, and
in the nineteenth century these lexically related words were sometimes used interchangeably, to
varying rhetorical effect. Women commentators on gender at the time, whose named presence in
public debate preceded Amin's controversial 1899 book, sometimes made careful distinctions
between the two, arguing that practices of extreme seclusion that still held sway among most
upper-class families were detrimental to women's lives but that veiling was not in itself a
deterrent to anything. And it is also important to keep in mind that what "unveiling" signified
when Amin was writing is what now, in Egypt, usually signifies "veiling": uncovered hands,
feet, and face, but covered hair and body. He was not necessarily advocating "westernization" of
Egypt's women or its families. (And I wonder how Asad can confidently observe that Amin and
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his peers believed "affection between husband and wife [was] unknown in Egypt until Western
reformers proposed it" [234]). Amin's argument had to do not only with the emerging formation
of the nuclear family (whose newness was perhaps more discursive than otherwise, which
supports rather than undermines Asad's thesis), but also with arguments about urban women's
productive, waged work outside the home. Moreover, Amin, in 1899, made a far more careful
argument than Asad implies, and I disagree with Asad, who follows Leila Ahmed on this point,
that Amin's argument misogynistically echoed the justificatory rhetoric of British colonial
officials, who did inveigh against veiling in their bid to "civilize" Egypt by that familiar
rhetorical route, "saving the local women." The substance and rhetorical trajectory of Amin's
argument differed in its routing through a reading of shari'a and its subordination of the issue of
clothing practices to that of the absolute seclusion of females from adolescence on. Amin, like
dozens of other commentators on this issue at the time, drew from more than one well to steep
his concoction, and not simply from the poisoned well of would-be mentors among Egypt's
colonial administrators and among the more informal, overlapping layers of European presence
in the region.
To produce the important grounded research that Asad calls for will require more work in
nineteenth-century Arabic texts, the specific rhetorics of which have been largely ignored. For
example, the contributions of the nineteenth-century Arabic novel—the very existence of which
has been barely acknowledged by scholars of Arabic letters until recently—to emergent
understandings of the family in/as society constitute a crucial area of inquiry. (As Asad notes en
passant, it is not simply the print culture of a society that matters to imagining community, as
Benedict Anderson has so famously outlined, but fiction, as a way of imagining pasts and futures
[p. 14n15]).
The importance of this book lies in its synthetic brilliance, its suggestive linkages and its
warnings against facile and self-indulgent academic polemics. A good book compels one to
grapple with the understandings one brings to its reading, and Formations of the Secular gets an
impeccable score on those grounds. With the fall of triumphalist narratives of modernization that
assumed a teleological path toward secularization worldwide, scholars must question rigorously
the purchase of "the secular" on our concepts of and assumptions about "modernity." At the same
time, we must avoid an opposite path: the tendency to explain collective and individual
motivations as based on a reified notion of "the religious," disturbingly evident now in the uses
public discourse makes of terms such as "Islamic," "fundamentalist," and jihad. Asad's forceful
and passionate work demonstrates that the problem of incommensurate categories, whether they
be "Islam" and "the West" or "secular" and "religious," is not simply an analytic problem.
Rather, getting such categories wrong is a political error that feeds misunderstanding and
violence in today's world, ones that secularism's "tolerance" not only cannot undo but also has
helped to foster or even to create.
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